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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1651 
_____________ 
 
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
VERONICA N. FIGUEROA, Administratrix of Estate of Ernesto Figueroa,  
also known as Ernesto F. Carrion, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5:09 -cv-03069) 
District Judge: Hon. James Knoll Gardner 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 15, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANASKIE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 9, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Liberty Life Insurance Company (“Liberty Life”) brought this action in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Victoria N. 
Figueroa, the Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Ernesto Figueroa, seeking a 
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declaratory judgment that the company is not obligated to provide benefits under Mr. 
Figueroa‟s accidental death insurance policy.  The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Liberty Life, holding that there was no coverage under the policy 
because Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not the result of an “accidental bodily injury.”  We 
disagree and will reverse. 
I. Background 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume familiarity with the case 
and discuss only those facts necessary to our decision.  On the night of January 29, 2008, 
Ernesto Figueroa went to the Lehigh Valley Hospital emergency room with complaints of 
abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting.  After an initial examination, doctors ordered a 
CT scan with contrast dye.  On the morning of January 30, Mr. Figueroa received the 
intravenous injection of contrast dye.  Approximately one minute into the injection, Mr. 
Figueroa became nauseous, vomited multiple times, became “diffusely erythematous,” 
and began scratching himself.  Mr. Figueroa began to seize as he was brought back to the 
emergency room.  He was administered epinephrine for apparent anaphylaxis, received 
CPR, and was intubated.  Mr. Figueroa subsequently developed ventricular fibrillation, 
which did not respond to medication or defibrillation.  He died at 7:37 a.m. on January 
30, 2011.  An autopsy confirmed Mr. Figueroa‟s cause of death as “acute anaphylaxis 
following intravenous dye administration.”  (A. 82.) 
Mr. Figueroa and his wife, Margarita Carrion, were insured under an accidental 
death insurance policy issued by Liberty Life.  The policy provided for an “Accidental 
Death Benefit” in the amount of the unpaid balance of Mr. Figueroa‟s home mortgage 
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upon “due proof [that the insured‟s] death occurred . . . as the direct and sole result of 
accidental bodily injury.”  (A. 22.)   
Ms. Carrion submitted a claim to Liberty Life for benefits under the policy.  
Liberty Life denied the claim and subsequently initiated this action against Victoria N. 
Figueroa, Mr. Figueroa‟s daughter and the Administratrix of his estate, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it is not obligated to pay benefits under the policy.  The District 
Court held oral argument on the parties‟ cross-motions for summary judgment and on 
February 25, 2011, issued an opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Liberty Life on the ground that Ms. Figueroa “had not met [her] initial burden of 
establishing that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was an „accidental bodily injury‟ under the plain 
language of the policy.”  Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Figueroa, No. 09-cv-03069, 2011 WL 
835939, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2011). The District Court did not reach the separate 
issue of whether the insurance policy‟s exclusion for death resulting “directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part, from . . . disease, illness or infirmity of the body or mind” 
applies to preclude coverage.  In her instant appeal, Ms. Figueroa maintains that Mr. 
Figueroa‟s death resulted from an accidental bodily injury under the terms of the policy 
and that his death does not fall within the policy‟s exclusion for death resulting “directly 
or indirectly, in whole or in part, from disease, illness or infirmity.” 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review of a district court‟s order resolving cross-motions for summary judgment.  
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Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 2011).  We also exercise 
plenary review over a district court‟s interpretation of state law, as well as its conclusion 
as to the legal operation of an insurance policy.  Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. KSI Trading 
Corp., 563 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2009).  The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania 
substantive law governs this diversity matter. 
III. Discussion 
A. Accidental Bodily Injury 
In holding that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not the result of an “accidental bodily 
injury,” the District Court relied on this Court‟s observation in State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009), that “„[q]ualification of 
a particular incident as an accident seems to depend on two criteria:  1. the degree of 
foreseeability, and 2. the state of mind of the actor in intending or not intending the 
result.‟” 1  Id. at 111 (quoting Black‟s Law Dictionary 16 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting John F. 
Dobbyn, Insurance Law in a Nutshell 129 (3d ed. 1996)).  The District Court stated that 
because it was unable to conclude that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was unforeseeable, it could 
not conclude that Ms. Figueroa had met her initial burden of showing that the death was 
                                              
1
 Liberty Life has argued that Mr. Figueroa did not suffer from an “accidental 
bodily injury,” without specifically arguing that Mr. Figueroa did not suffer from a 
“bodily injury.”  We attribute the absence of any argument on the issue of whether Mr. 
Figueroa‟s anaphylactic reaction constituted a “bodily injury” to the parties‟ recognition 
that it was, without question, such an injury.  See Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 
A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967) (holding that an insured‟s unintended fatal drug overdose 
constituted a “bodily injury . . . effected . . . through accidental means” within the terms 
of his life insurance policy). 
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the result of an “accidental bodily injury.”  In the District Court‟s view, Mr. Figueroa‟s 
death was foreseeable because it was a possible, albeit remote, consequence of being 
injected with contrast dye.   
“Foreseeable,” however, often means more than that which is merely “possible.”  
Indeed, the term is defined in the dictionary as “being such as may be reasonably 
anticipated.”  Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary 890 (1993).  Under that 
definition, to the extent Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not “reasonably anticipated,” it was not 
foreseeable.  While we think a better view of “foreseeability” in this context would be the 
degree to which an event is reasonably anticipated or expected, we will refrain from 
analyzing the “foreseeability” of Mr. Figueroa‟s death because the “foreseeability” of an 
event does not control whether it qualifies as an accident under Pennsylvania law.
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In Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union 
Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the 
dictionary definition of “accident” as “[a]n unexpected and undesirable event,” or 
“something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally,” stated that “[t]he key term in 
the ordinary definition of „accident‟ is „unexpected,‟” which, the Court explained, 
“implies a degree of fortuity.”  Id. at 897-98 (citing Webster‟s II New College Dictionary 
                                              
2
 It bears noting that notwithstanding our reference in Mehlman to foreseeability, 
the holding in Mehlman that an insured‟s conduct in attempting to shoot another was not 
“accidental” under Pennsylvania law did not at all turn on foreseeability, but rather on 
our determination that the insured, despite his intoxication, had intended his actions.  See 
Mehlman, 589 F.3d at 111-14.  Moreover, we explicitly stated that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court “has emphasized that the fortuity of the events in question is the key 
factor to consider in making [the] determination [of whether there has been an 
accident].”  Id. at 111 (emphasis added). 
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6 (2001)).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further explained that “„the test of 
whether injury is a result of an accident is to be determined from the viewpoint of the 
insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that committed the act causing the injury.‟” 
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 292 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Mohn v. 
Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 326 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1974)).  Thus, under Pennsylvania 
precedent, “we are required to determine whether, from the perspective of the insured, the 
claim[] asserted by [Ms. Figueroa] present[s] the degree of fortuity contemplated by the 
ordinary definition of „accident.‟”  Id. at 293.  We believe that from Mr. Figueroa‟s 
perspective, the fatal anaphylactic reaction was an exceedingly unexpected consequence 
of receiving the contrast dye injection.
 3
  Consequently, we hold that under Pennsylvania 
law, Mr. Figueroa‟s death was the result of an “accidental bodily injury” within the 
meaning of the policy. 
B. “Disease, Illness or Infirmity” Exclusion 
Because the District Court held that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not covered under 
the policy as a death resulting from an “accidental bodily injury,” it did not reach Liberty 
Life‟s alternative argument that coverage was precluded under the policy‟s exclusion for 
“death which results directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from . . . disease, illness or 
                                              
3
 Although the record indicates that an “[a]llergic reaction warning was given” 
(A. 55), it is not clear whether Mr. Figueroa was specifically warned about the risk of a 
fatal reaction.  Regardless, in light of the very low risk of severe or fatal anaphylaxis, the 
warning does not render Mr. Figueroa‟s injury the “the natural and expected result” of 
his receiving the contrast dye.  See Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 292 (“An injury . . . is 
not „accidental‟ if the injury was the natural and expected result of the insured‟s 
actions.”). 
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infirmity of the body or mind.”  (A. 22.)  Liberty Life argued below and maintains on 
appeal that this exclusionary clause applies because Mr. Figueroa‟s gastrointestinal 
illness, which the autopsy revealed to be caused by “[n]umerous diverticula . . . present in 
the descending colon” (A. 87), “precipitated [the] chain of events” that resulted in Mr. 
Figueroa receiving the intravenous injection of contrast dye.  (Liberty Life‟s Br. at 23.) 
In Shiffler v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 838 F.2d 78 
(3d Cir. 1988), this Court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that when an insurance 
“policy contains a . . . clause precluding recovery if the death was caused directly or 
indirectly by disease, there can be no recovery if the preexisting disease contributed to 
the death.”  Id. at 84 (emphasis added).  It is clear that Mr. Figueroa‟s illness was not a 
contributing factor in his death, it being undisputed that the sole cause of death was 
“acute anaphylaxis.”  (A. 82.)  See Speer v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 43 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1945) (holding that because it was an admitted fact that the insured‟s death 
was due solely to a skull fracture from falling on a concrete floor, “death could not have 
been due, even partially, to a preexisting disease or infirmity”).  We accordingly hold that 
Mr. Figueroa‟s death does not fall within the policy‟s exclusion for death “result[ing] 
directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from . . . disease, illness or infirmity of the body 
or mind.” 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Liberty Life, and remand with instructions for the District Court to 
enter judgment in favor of Ms. Figueroa. 
